Experimentation is an emotive word; fewer people would support 'experiments' on animals than would support medical research using animals. So the opponents of experiments on embryos may have gained some advantage by having the issue described in those terms. Experimentation (or research) has occurred, of course; otherwise the 600 or so babies born after in vitro fertilization would never have entered the world. Professor Gordon Dunstan (a member of the Warnock Committee) reminded his audience of this reality as he introduced a meeting on this topic at the Open Section of the Royal Society of Medicine on 1 October 1984. Anyone who rejected all experiments on embryos would have to assert that the work leading to test-tube babies had been mistaken.
Dr Simon Fishel, one of the team working with Dr R G Edwards in Cambridge, explained the complexities of the early stages of conception and embryonic development. Biological errors were common: two sperm might fertilize a single ovum, for example, and many of those errors were incompatible with development of a fetusthough the embryo might appear normal in the early stages. Research would help unravel the complexities of these early abnormalities and would also help understanding of phenomena such as twinning. Dr Fishel's own view was that research was justifiable early in embryonic development but he would set a limit somewhere below 30 days, at which time electrical activity was detectable in the nervous tissue. Indeed in his current research he would not use embryos beyond the 12th day.
Mr Robert Winston, who treats infertile couples at the Royal Postgraduate Medical School, London, said that most scientists and clinicians had constant doubtsand most believed they had been misrepresented by journalists. He thought it important for people to realize that at least 30% of all embryos were lost before implantation. (In the context of this debate it was also worth recalling that around two million fetuses had been aborted legally in Britain in the past 17 years.) He believed that research on embryos would lead to better treatment of infertility, a reduced wastage from spontaneous abortion, a lowered risk of genetic defects in babies, better treatment for genetic disorders, and improved contraception.
The Reverend John Mahoney, SJ, gave the final presentation and began by explaining the position Report of meeting held by the Open Section, 1 October 1984. Accepted 11 February 1985 of the Catholic Church. Pope John Paul had categorically condemned all experimentation on human embryos, and in this he was following the pronouncement of the Second Vatican Council, 20 years ago, that 'from the moment of its conception life must be guarded with the greatest care'. Yet historians and other scholars had shown that for centuries the church's attitude as to how and when a new human person came into existence had more nuances. The thirteenth century Dominican, Thomas Aquinas, represented a very strong tradition in ascribing the advent of the human soul to about the 40th day of pregnancy.
Of course the official teaching of the Catholic Church continued to be that, irrespective of whether or not the early embryo was possessed of personhood, its destruction was morally unjustifiable. But on what grounds was embryonic existence considered sacrosanct? As late as 1974 official Roman Catholic teaching had given as its reason that we simply did not know the status of the embryo in its earliest days of existence and had, therefore, to presume that it was a human person, possessing a human soul, from the time of fertilization. If absolute respect for embryonic existence was a presumption based on factual ignorance, and if advances in science and in embryology could gradually provide reasonably reliable knowledge about the early embryo, and its human identity and status, then we might reasonably expect our moral conclusions to be modified accordingly. But many seemed disposed to disregard what appeared to be new facts, or difficulties involved in their reading of the facts, and it was tempting to conclude that they did not wish to change their moral conclusion.
In turning now to the Warnock Report, he suggested that there was an intriguing, and not dissimilar, incoherence in its consideration of the status of the human embryo. In its Foreword, the report (echoing Mill) referred to 'the truth that matters of ultimate value are not susceptible of proof', and when it addressed the question which he had been considering it appeared to falter in its treatment. It explained that 'although the questions of when life or personhood begin appear to be questions of fact susceptible of straightforward answers, we hold that the answers to such questions in fact are complex amalgams of factual and moral judgements. Instead of trying to answer these questions directly we have therefore gone straight to the question of how it is right to treat the human embryo. We have considered what status ought to be accorded to the human embryo, and the answer we give must necessarily be in terms of ethical or moral principles'.
In the view of Father Mahoney, Warnock had thrown up its hands too readily before the question of when personhood began, and in additionand for that reasonit seemed to be lacking in identifying the ethical or moral principles which, it claimed, would provide an answer to the question of what status should be accorded the human embryo. It had gone on to 'recommend that the embryo of the human species should be afforded some protection in law', but nowhere in the report could he find the grounds for according it that protection, other than a statement, 'we were agreed that the embryo of the human species ought to have a special status'.
Father Mahoney regretted that the Warnock Committee had decided not to attempt to unravel the complexity of factual and moral judgments involved in asking and answering the question, 'When does personhood begin?' -though he had considerable sympathy for its approach. For terms such as 'person' were morally and emotionally loaded. To ascribe personhood was, by implication, not just in Locke's sense to be prepared to apportion praise or blame, but in a wider sense to commit oneself to adopting certain attitudes of respect and regard. And, in a weaker, but still significant manner, one might be implicitly making, or demanding, similar commitments in speaking of 'human beings' or even 'human life'.
In searching, perhaps vainly, for a more neutral term, he was attracted to the idea of individuality, rather than personhood.
The Warnock Committee, however, had disqualified itself from this or similar lines of inquiry by its self-denying ordinance; so he could only conclude that its report contained no explicit moral basis for requiring 'some protection in law' for the embryo of the human species. What it did appear to express was an unarticulated sense that some fundamental respect was owing to the embryo of our species; and in this it appeared to be not all that distant from the Catholic tradition.
During the discussion the two research workers explained that there was no call from scientists for an extension of the current limit, set by consensus at around 14 days. Scientists were, they said, obedient to social controls. Indeed, Mr Winston said that with so much research to do his team preferred to concentrate on other projects until such time as society reached a clear consensus.
Professor Dunstan summed up the discussion, arguing that the language of rights was not very useful. Everyone recognized that the embryo had some moral claim upon society and that society had a sense of duty to protect embryos from events that had yet to be determined. But it was the duty of the moralist to submit to the facts -and these were in a state of change.
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